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Using Socio-Economics and Binary Economics to 
Serve the Interests of Poor and Working People: 
What Critical Scholars Can Do To Help 
Robert Ashford 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If anyone in legal education doubts whether there are a growing number 
of law teachers (1) concerned about the well-being of poor and working 
people in the U.S. and throughout the world, (2) opposed to practices of 
subordination and other injustices, and (3) eager to do something to 
improve things, let them attend a LatCrit meeting. LatCrit scholars, along 
with feminist scholars and other critical scholars, have (1) raised 
consciousness and sensitivity to the deep patterns and practices regarding 
subordination and the abuse of power, (2) heightened normative concerns 
related to legal policy and justice, and (3) taken positive steps to create an 
environment where teachers with a critical perspective are more often hired, 
tenured, and promoted to positions of power and authority within legal 
education. Institutions, which a generation ago were a part of the problem, 
have increasingly become a part of the solution. Yet, presentations, 
comments, and conversations at the 2008 Thirteenth Annual LatCrit 
Conference at Seattle University revealed that there is widespread 
agreement among these scholars that much subordination and injustice 
continue and that there is much more good work to be done. 
These scholars share a widespread agreement that one of the most serious 
problems that persists is that of economic injustice. Most agree that the 
failure to achieve economic justice is systemically related to the distribution 
of economic opportunity and economic power. And few critical scholars 
disagree that economic injustice is not only an unsolved problem in itself, 
but a problem that helps those with power to perpetuate other injustices. 
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Finally, it is fair to say that among critical scholars, there is almost no 
support for the school of thought within legal education commonly known 
as law and economics1 (but more accurately called “law and neoclassical 
economics”). There is considerable agreement that this approach to law-
related economic issues, as it is commonly practiced, does not serve the 
interests of poor and working people very well; and it may be viewed fairly 
as an instrument of subordination (primarily because it fails to consider, or 
consider fairly, the causes and effects of the highly concentrated distribution 
of wealth that prevails in the U.S. and throughout the world). But beyond 
this broad agreement among most of the attendants at the LatCrit XIII 
Conference, there was no widespread agreement or even clear 
understanding as to the causes of economic injustice, the institutions that 
perpetuate it, or what critical scholars can do to beneficially address the 
problem. This lack of widespread agreement and understanding regarding 
economic matters is characteristic of society as a whole. When one 
considers that clarity regarding economic issues and rights is of vital 
importance to people everywhere, and that one of the most important duties 
of lawyers and other advocates is to enable clients to identify and secure 
their essential rights and responsibilities in society, such clarity should also 
be of vital importance to critical scholars in legal education, practicing 
lawyers, and others who advocate for poor and working people. This article 
is offered to assist critical scholars to reform legal education so that 
advocates for poor and working people are provided the educational 
opportunity to gain greater clarity regarding law-related economic issues in 
order to enable them to better serve their clients in the economic realm. 
To more effectively address and remedy the problem of economic 
injustice, this article argues that LatCrit scholars, feminist scholars, and 
scholars of other critical schools (herein “critical scholars”) should learn, 
teach, employ, and promote two important, related subjects that are 
receiving increasing attention but that are still not widely understood: socio-
economics (a broad interdisciplinary approach to economics grounded in 
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the scientific method and moral philosophy that draws upon all disciplines 
relevant to the understanding of economic phenomena) and binary 
economics (a subject within socio-economics that places great importance 
on democratizing the process of capital acquisition as a means of promoting 
widespread prosperity and economic justice for all people).2 By learning, 
teaching, employing, and promoting the socio-economic approach to law-
related economic issues, scholars will enhance legal education, scholarship, 
service, and practice in ways that better serve the interests of poor and 
working people because socio-economics places special emphasis on the 
causes and effects of the distribution of economic opportunity and wealth 
on economic phenomena and economic justice. By learning, teaching, 
employing, and promoting binary economics, scholars will advance 
understanding of an approach that will enable people to identify and secure 
a very important, but little understood, economic right that is obscured by 
the law and neoclassical economics approach: namely, the right to acquire 
capital with the earnings of capital. 
Part II of this article: provides a brief overview of law and neoclassical 
economics; identifies its limitations; and, explains how its misapplication in 
legal reasoning has been used to undermine the legitimate interests of poor 
and working people for the benefit of those in power. Part III describes the 
alternative socio-economic approach and explains how it can: supplement 
the law and neoclassical economics approach with an approach both more 
rigorous and favorable to the interests of poor and working people; preserve 
economics’ proper application; and, prevent its abuse by recourse to sound 
economic principles—principles that are widely recognized in the broader 
discipline of economics but ignored by many of the advocates of law and 
neoclassical economics. Part IV provides an overview of binary economics 
and explains how binary economic principles can be used to empower poor 
and working people in a lasting way that both distributes earning power 
more broadly and promotes economic well-being for all people without 
redistribution. To achieve this economic empowerment, Part IV explains 
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how binary economic principles can extend the democratic, competitive 
access to the institutions of finance that presently facilitate capital 
acquisition with the earnings of capital primarily for well-capitalized people 
to all people. These institutions include corporate finance, fiduciary law, 
commercial credit, private and public insurance and reinsurance, and central 
bank monetization. Part V concludes with a brief consideration of how 
critical scholars can better serve the interests of poor and working people by 
assisting in the growing movements: to replace the law and neoclassical 
economics approach with the socio-economic approach, and to include 
within teaching, scholarship, advocacy and other service, the binary 
economic analysis of the dynamics of wealth distribution, wealth 
maximization, and the competitive right to acquire capital with earnings of 
capital. 
II. LAW AND NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS 
As intimated in Part I of this article, based on information provided in 
numerous presentations and conversations at the 2008 Thirteenth Annual 
LatCrit Conference at Seattle University, there was virtually no support for 
the law and neoclassical economics approach to law-related economic 
issues. There was considerable agreement that this approach to law-related 
economic issues, as it is commonly practiced, does not serve the interests of 
poor and working people very well; and to the contrary, the approach may 
be fairly viewed as an instrument of suppression. Critical scholars view the 
law and neoclassical economics approach negatively primarily because it 
ignores the causes and consequences of the highly concentrated distribution 
of wealth that exists in the U.S. and almost everywhere in the world. 
Beyond this criticism, LatCrit participants most often criticized law and 
neoclassical economics for its unrealistic foundational assumptions and its 
lack of empirical rigor. Others candidly confessed that in their teaching and 
scholarship, they chose to simply ignore the law and neoclassical economics 
jurisprudence. And this choice to ignore law and neoclassical economics is 
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also widely reflected in much critical literature. However, none of the 
participants I encountered thought that either merely criticizing or simply 
ignoring law and neoclassical economics would reduce the economic 
injustice in society or would prevent its negative impacts on the interests of 
poor and working people. 
The stark reality is that formal legal education is overwhelmingly 
dominated by an approach to law and economics that poorly serves the 
interests of poor and working people. Because of this dominance, 
generations of law students have graduated and become lawyers with either 
an inaccurate, incomplete, or complete lack of understanding of many, if 
not most, law-related economic issues. Thus, many lawyers with 
responsibilities to assist poor and working people work with diminished 
ability to do so. Reducing this harm requires (1) formulating one or more 
positive alternatives to law and neoclassical economics built on a better and 
more complete foundational understanding of law-related economic issues 
that better serves the interests of poor and working people, and (2) winning 
widespread acceptance of those alternatives within legal education. As 
explained in Parts III and IV, separately and together, socio-economics and 
binary economics provide such alternatives in many important law-related 
contexts. As explained in Part V, critical scholars can do much to hasten the 
widespread acceptance of socio-economics and binary economics so as to 
better serve the interests of poor and working people. 
Before proceeding further, however, it should be noted that although law 
and neoclassical economics is by far the dominant approach to law and 
economics within legal education (and the only approach that usually comes 
to mind among legal scholars who are unfamiliar with that field), it is by no 
means the only approach to law and economics found within legal 
education. Other approaches include “institutional law and economics,”3 
“behavioral law and economics,”4 “new institutional economics,”5 “feminist 
law and economics,”6 “left-wing law and economics,”7 and a much earlier 
approach to law and economics (by means limited to neoclassical 
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economics) sometimes called “the first law and economics”8 and “the first 
great law and economics movement.”9 Each of these approaches takes issue 
with various aspects of the troublesome law and neoclassical economics 
approach; and to the extent that they become better understood and 
advanced more widely in legal education, each alternative approach 
certainly would both (1) enhance the understanding of law-related economic 
issues, and (2) better serve the interests of poor and working people. 
However, these alternatives are presently largely beyond the mainstream of 
the neoclassical approach that dominates teaching, scholarship, and research 
in “law and economics.” It remains to be seen whether in time these 
approaches, either separately or together, might grow to become a part of 
the dominant approach to law and economics so as to achieve the dual goals 
of rendering “law and economics” both (1) a more rigorous and lawyerly 
approach to law-related economic issues, and also (2) an approach that 
better serves the interests of poor and working people. Nevertheless, for 
reasons explained more fully below, I believe that the socio-economic 
approach (which includes all of these approaches and more) is a superior 
approach to achievement of both goals. 
A. Economic Theory, Neoclassical Economics, and the Neoclassical 
Economic Paradigm 
Although, by the plain meaning of its components, the phrase “law and 
economics” used within legal education would seem to denote an academic 
enterprise that incorporates the full richness of the discipline of economics 
to inform and enhance legal analysis in a fair and balanced way (as good 
teaching and scholarship in harmony with lawyers’ professional ethics 
would seem to require), sadly this is not the case.10 This richer range of 
economic theory and practice encompassed in the discipline of economics is 
of course enormously important in informing one’s understanding of how 
people behave economically, how economic institutions should be 
structured, how the economy works, how the economy should work, and 
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how people should determine and advance their economic interests in 
society. Whether derived from a formal study that leads to an advanced 
degree or merely from the popular media, one’s understanding of 
economics significantly influences a great deal of one’s beliefs about many 
things. In the U.S., for example, it influences whether a person is a 
Democrat, Republican, or Independent; a left-winger, a right-winger, or a 
centrist; a liberal, conservative, moderate, or radical; a capitalist or socialist; 
a believer in market solutions or government solutions to problems; and 
whether one favors or opposes more taxation and redistribution. One’s 
understanding of economics influences how people analyze why poverty 
persists, what the requisites for equal opportunity are, and how people do 
and do not achieve their highest good. It shapes people’s reactions to the 
importance of autonomy and community, as well as to private and public 
property. It shapes the way academics approach their teaching, scholarship, 
and service in many of the social and natural sciences, in business and law, 
and in many interdisciplinary endeavors, as well as the judgments of the 
university administrators who set their salaries and distribute awards of 
distinction and other perquisites. One’s understanding of economics 
influences the agendas of many charitable institutions, most, if not all, of 
the major foundations that explore “policy analysis,” and many government 
agencies; therefore, it influences their willingness to fund a wide array of 
university activities. It influences the editorial slant of broadcast, cable, 
print, and online media, commentators, and analysis. It influences one’s 
approach to Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and other faiths. When there is 
disagreement in the classroom and in society, if the disagreement is not one 
of religion or secular morality, chances are it is grounded in economics. 
Yet, from its inception and continuing to this day, this fuller range of 
economic theory and practice was and continues to be intentionally, and 
perhaps strategically, omitted from the dominant law and economics 
approach in favor of a concentration largely limited to neoclassical 
economics.11 How this limited view of economics could ever be considered 
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as an adequate, comprehensive, balanced, and an ethical, positive, and 
normative foundation for informing and guiding law students, practitioners, 
teachers, and scholars regarding their understanding of law-related 
economic issues has never, to my knowledge, been addressed by the 
advocates of law and neoclassical economics. 
Because of its reliance on the assumed existence of “efficient markets,” 
most neoclassical economic analysis is based on a set of simplifying 
assumptions, which are used to analyze the most efficient private and public 
choices regarding the allocation of resources according to various 
preferences under specified conditions.12 These assumptions include the 
following: 
1. People behave rationally; 
2. People act only in self-interest; 
3. People are fully informed; 
4. Prices are determined without collusion by supply and 
demand; 
5. All costs of production are reflected prices (i.e., there are no 
“externalities”); 
6. There are no transactions costs (including taxes); 
7. There are no barriers to market entry or exit; 
8. Income distribution is according to productivity; 
9. Initial distribution of wealth preferences, skills, tastes, and 
technology are exogenous (taken as externally given); 
10. Factors such as race, gender, class, and nature can be 
ignored or encapsulated within the market; 
11. Economic decisions are made “at the margin” by evaluating 
the costs and benefits of an additional unit of one alternative 
compared to another (including the alternative of doing 
nothing);  
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12. Markets tend or gravitate toward a stable, efficient 
equilibrium; and 
13. The best starting point for economic analysis is one that 
accepts as essentially factually accurate, or approximately 
factually accurate, the existence of conditions necessary for 
perfect competition, including no barriers to market entry, 
perfect knowledge, and zero transactions costs.13 
Based on these assumptions, neoclassical economic analysis examines 
the anticipated costs and benefits that result from mutually exclusive 
choices of behavior (based on individual preferences) regarding one 
additional unit of any production or consumption compared to additional 
unit costs and benefits of other alternatives (including the choice of doing 
nothing). Neoclassical analysis then goes on to “demonstrate” that the 
unfettered exercise of individual choice in the production and consumption 
of goods and services will result in the optimally efficient allocation of 
resources according to the preferences of market participants. Under such 
conditions, promoters of law and neoclassical economics claim that societal 
wealth is maximized by the efficient allocation of resources. 
Neoclassical economics, with its marginal analysis, is not in itself 
objectionable to the interests of poor and working people. To the contrary, 
neoclassical economic analysis can be a very helpful tool when applied 
properly. Indeed, included among the growing number of socio-economists 
are many neoclassical economists.14 It is not the tool, but its abuse that 
raises factual, normative, and legal concerns. As with any tool, neoclassical 
economics can be used beneficially or abused. Nevertheless, in this analysis 
of how wealth is maximized, although ostensibly every individual’s 
preferences are respected, the preferences of the wealthy count much more 
than the preferences of the poor. And under the assumptions set forth above, 
although the unfettered exercise of individual preferences may sometimes 
produce the greatest good, the determination of what is good and the 
distribution of that good in most, if not all, economies is highly uneven and 
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leaves the preferences of some abundantly fulfilled and the preferences of 
others entirely frustrated. 
However, as explained more fully below, the maximization of efficiency 
is not synonymous with the maximization of wealth; and the systemic abuse 
of neoclassical economics is perhaps most clearly problematic when people 
(who do or should know better) advance its limited and specialized claim of 
wealth maximization (under the thirteen conditions specified above) as a 
pervasive conceptual framework or paradigm for achieving and 
understanding the overall societal wealth maximization.15 Teaching, 
scholarship, and policy analysis that wrongly equates the maximization of 
efficiency with wealth maximization is a grievous error. It misuses the 
efficiency analysis of neoclassical economics—a highly valuable 
conceptual tool when properly applied—to support the dubious wealth 
maximizing claims made by advocates of “the neoclassical economic 
paradigm.” The neoclassical economic paradigm is a pervasive way of 
viewing many aspects of society and institutions, including markets, 
property rights, professional ethics, personal morality, and the role of 
government. This paradigm’s abuse has caused great harm to education and 
society in general, and to the interests of poor and working people in 
particular. 
Neoclassical analysis that wrongly equates the maximization of 
efficiency with the maximization of wealth is particularly pronounced in 
legal education under the rubric of “law and economics.”16 For reasons 
suggested above and explained more fully below, this abuse of neoclassical 
principles (although by no means confined to legal education) works to the 
serious disadvantage of poor and working people; and the economic harm 
done by this abuse cannot be avoided or undone by ignoring the 
neoclassical paradigm, ridiculing its unrealistic assumptions and lack of 
empirical rigor, or even by “beating those who advance it at their own 
game.” What is needed to remedy the harm is one or more effective 
alternative methodologies that provide sound positive and normative 
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analysis of law-related economic issues that preserve the benefits of 
neoclassical analysis when properly applied and enrich it with a broader and 
more rigorous understanding. To this end, as will be more fully explained, 
socio-economists seek “to examine the assumptions of the neoclassical 
paradigm, develop a rigorous understanding of its limitations, improve upon 
its application, and develop alternative, perhaps complementary, approaches 
that are predictive, exemplary, and morally sound.”17 
B. Problematic Foundational Propositions of Law and Neoclassical   
Economics that Give Rise to the Abuse of Neoclassical Economics 
One does not need a PhD in economics or even a beginner’s mastery of 
its basic principles to accurately identify and challenge the misapplication 
of neoclassical economics. Although complicated in its detail, the 
widespread misapplication of the law and neoclassical economics approach 
has, at its foundation, only a relatively few erroneous economic principles. 
Some of the most important erroneous propositions are set forth below and 
discussed more fully in the paragraphs that follow: 
1. When efficiency is maximized, societal wealth is therefore 
also maximized; 
2. The maximization of efficiency has meaning independent of 
the distribution of wealth; 
3. The best starting point for economic analysis is one that 
assumes markets are operating at or near perfect efficiency; 
and 
4. The maximization of total societal wealth derived from 
maximizing efficiency is a distinct value to be weighed and 
judged along with other values when formulating social 
policy. 
Each of these erroneous propositions is discussed more fully below. 
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1. When Efficiency Is Maximized, Societal Wealth Is Also Maximized 
As noted in Part II-A above, one problematic deficiency with the law and 
neoclassical economics approach is its erroneous claim that the 
maximization of efficiency is synonymous with the maximization of wealth. 
This false proposition represents perhaps the most serious, but least 
understood, confusion that prevails among law students, law graduates, and 
the general public regarding economic theory and government policy. 
Efficiency can be considered synonymous with wealth maximization only 
under highly conditional circumstances that do not prevail in the real world. 
This erroneous proposition carries with it great power of persuasion because 
it feeds into one of the great ethics systems commonly known as 
utilitarianism—an approach that roughly equates morality, goodness, and 
justice with the greatest good for the greatest number. It is the widespread 
confusion of efficiency maximization with wealth maximization that 
provides the foundation for the frequently false wealth-maximizing claims 
of the neoclassical paradigm, which then justifies tax benefits that flow 
primarily to well-capitalized people and the widely accepted false 
dichotomies of “wealth maximization vs. distributional justice” and 
“efficiency vs. other values.” 
On the strength of this false equation of efficiency and wealth 
maximization, proponents of the law and neoclassical economics approach 
argue that by establishing and enforcing legal rules and rights (including 
market rules, liability rules, property rights, and contract rights) that 
maximize microeconomic efficiency, judges, legislatures, and executive 
agencies will thereby maximize societal wealth. This false claim provides 
the theoretical foundation for right-wing ideology, laissez-faire policies, and 
the notion that all regulation presumptively compromises or suppresses 
wealth maximization by promoting a less efficient allocation of resources. 
This claim is evident, for example, in the approach set forth in Judge 
Posner’s book, Economic Analysis of Law.18 In advancing his neoclassical 
approach to the analysis of law, Judge Posner states, “What Adam Smith 
Serving Poor and Working People Through Economics 185 
VOLUME 8 • ISSUE 1 • 2009 
referred to as a nation’s wealth, what this book refers to as the efficiency 
ethic, and what a layman might call the size of the pie, has always been an 
important social value.”19 Judge Posner compounds his error by declaring 
that the connection between economic efficiency and economic growth is 
uncontroversial.20 
Although few American law students and law school graduates who have 
had exposure to law and neoclassical economics would recognize anything 
inaccurate about Judge Posner’s statement, in one crucial respect, it is dead 
wrong as a matter of good economics. Judge Posner’s serious error stems 
from the fact that Adam Smith’s usage of “wealth” involved his attempt to 
explain scientifically how nations accumulate wealth over time and how 
some nations’ economies grow larger while the economies of other nations 
do not.21 Adam Smith was thus attempting to develop a theory of growth, 
and his Wealth of Nations did indeed lay the foundation for modern 
economics.22 For Smith, economic growth over time did indeed determine 
what the common person would consider a “size of the pie.” In this respect, 
Judge Posner’s statement is correct. However, Judge Posner is incorrect 
when he equates Smith’s approach to wealth maximization resulting from 
economic growth with his (Judge Posner’s) efficiency ethic.23 Judge Posner 
confuses Smith’s classical theory of growth leading to wealth maximization 
with the neoclassical theory of efficiency, which was notably advanced in 
the English-speaking world by Alfred Marshall. 
As a matter of positive economics, however, efficiency and growth are 
quite distinct concepts. Neoclassical efficiency is not a general theory of 
growth or wealth maximization, as advanced by Adam Smith. In a 
shrinking, dying economy, every transaction might be neoclassically 
efficient, and various conceptions of efficiency (whether as defined by 
Pareto, Kaldor-Hicks, or others) could be, nevertheless, invariably 
satisfied.24 In fact, neoclassical efficiency, even when positively related to 
growth and wealth maximization, is only one component of a much more 
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complicated dynamic process that requires a broader approach to economics 
along with other disciplines to comprehend. 
Since the dawn of the industrial revolution, and increasingly so ever 
since, technology brings forth vast increases in productive capacity that are 
not primarily the result of the gains promised by marginal efficiency. For 
example, the great gains in wealth experienced in the U.S. since the 1850s 
are not continuous increments driven by marginal prices with causes rooted 
in constant technology and short time frames, which are the domain of 
neoclassical economics. Rather, these are discontinuous, sometimes 
explosively large changes in the productive capacity and the distribution of 
demand with causes rooted in technological progress, capital investment, 
and wealth distribution subject to limited competition, aided by selective 
government allocation and protection of property rights. 
Major breakthroughs in productive capacity—occasioning great increases 
in wealth—are not primarily the result of efficiency gains at the margin. In 
the corporate context, for example, major corporations flourish or fail in the 
surplus generated long before market prices of their factor inputs and 
products reach an efficient equilibrium. In this context, corporate wealth 
maximization requires maximizing both normal profits (those earned in 
perfectly competitive markets) and economic profits (those above normal 
profits) earned in the context of substantial technological advances and 
other conditions of imperfect efficiency.25 
The major elements in economic growth observed in market economies 
experiencing substantial growth occur when relevant markets are far from 
achieving perfect efficiency and when prices are far from the theoretical 
equilibrium.26 This is not to say that efficiency is not an important 
consideration in wealth-maximizing analysis, but it does not play the 
unambiguously positive and comprehensive role in wealth maximization 
that law and neoclassical economics ascribes to it. 
Thus, although there is no doubt that the immense growth evidenced by 
technologically advanced countries has occurred under conditions far 
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removed from the thirteen conditions set forth above which neoclassical 
efficiency depends upon, the principles of neoclassical efficiency are 
nevertheless widely and loosely advanced by Judge Posner and others who 
pass off law and neoclassical economics as the sole theory of law and 
economics and as a de facto theory of causation regarding growth and 
wealth maximization.27 Such analysis confuses marginal gains with wealth 
maximization and ignores the effect of the distribution of wealth, 
opportunities, risks, and uncertainties that can greatly affect wealth 
maximization and distribution over time in ways not comprehended by 
marginal efficiency analysis. 
For reasons set forth in Parts II-B-2, II-B-3, and II-B-4, this 
misapplication of neoclassical economic efficiency theory is highly 
prejudicial to the interests of poor and working people and has been widely 
used (whether consciously or not) as an instrument of oppression by many 
who formulate and implement law-related economic policy. For present 
purposes, however, it is important to understand that the assumption that 
maximizing efficiency necessarily or probably maximizes wealth is 
factually wrong as a matter of sound economics, and should therefore be 
regarded as wrong by any school of thought that operates under the label of 
law and economics. 
2. The Maximization of Efficiency Has Meaning Independent of the 
Distribution of Wealth  
 Another major misrepresentation that results from passing off 
neoclassical economics as the sole theory of economics is the false notion 
that efficiency maximization has rigorous meaning independent of 
distribution in theory and in fact.28 In other words, efficiency is dependent 
on distribution. The supposed wealth-enhancing allocation of benefits in 
efficient markets assumes that prices will lead to the optimal allocation of 
resources, labor, production, distribution, and consumption. As a positive 
matter of economics, however, the same logic that holds that prices 
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determine distribution also holds that distribution determines prices. This is 
a fact that receives relatively little emphasis among the advocates of law 
and neoclassical economics. No standard of efficiency is, or can be, neutral 
in distribution. Even when transactional costs are zero, externalities are 
negligible or nonexistent, and information is perfect, the assignment of 
property rights nevertheless affects prices and the allocation of resources. 
The fact that efficiency is dependent on distribution belies the notion that 
there is a single, determinable, wealth-maximizing standard of efficiency 
(independent of distribution), which can guide either economic policy or 
legal decision making. In economic theory and fact, there is no single 
paramount optimal efficiency, but rather, many distribution-dependent 
relative efficiencies. Thus, because efficiency is dependent on distribution, 
the notion that by establishing and enforcing legal rules and rights so as to 
maximize economic efficiency, or that by structuring legal rules to mimic 
market participants and societal wealth will be maximized by negotiations, 
judges, legislatures, and executive agencies, is wrong as a matter of sound 
economics. Considerations of efficiency under the thirteen assumed 
conditions set forth above do not determine how rights should be 
distributed. Rather, the distribution of rights determines what distribution-
dependent efficiencies result under those hypothetical conditions.29 
However, as commonly practiced, law and neoclassical economics 
accepts without question the existing distribution of wealth, and it measures 
efficiency by reference to that distribution and subsequent distributions 
derived from it. As Judge Posner candidly declares: 
[T]he efficiency ethic takes the existing distribution of income 
and wealth and the underlying human qualities that generate that 
distribution as given, and within very broad limits (what limits?) is 
uncritical of the changes in that distribution that are brought about 
by efficient transactions between persons unequally endowed with 
the world’s tangible and intangible goods.30 
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This is a wonderful approach for the rich, whose preferences have great 
potency, but it is not so wonderful for poor and working people, whose 
preferences count for much less. It is not surprising that there are many 
well-funded centers for law and neoclassical economics at well-endowed 
law schools that employ an analysis that considers distribution essentially 
irrelevant for the purposes of understanding wealth maximization. In 
contrast, there are relatively few centers for economic approaches that 
regard distribution not only as an important normative issue, but also an 
important positive issue affecting the size of the pie in addition to the size 
and distribution of the slices.31 
3. The Best Starting Point for Economic Analysis Is One that Assumes 
Markets Are Operating At or Near Perfect Efficiency  
Like neoclassical economics, on which it heavily relies, law and 
neoclassical economics assumes that markets are operating at perfect or 
near-perfect efficiency. Yet, according to The New Palgrave: A Dictionary 
of Economics, a widely accepted economic authority, “a large volume of 
work . . . suggests that [the neoclassical assumption of] perfect competition 
corresponds to an extremely special, limiting case of a more general theory 
of markets and that no important market fully satisfies the conditions of 
perfect competition and that most would not appear even to come close.”32 
The false assumption that perfect, or near-perfect, market efficiency is 
the best starting point for law and economic analysis, disadvantages the 
poor and working people in a number of ways. It implies that: 
1. Efficiency is the primary cause of growth; 
2. Prices are fair, and people wealthy enough to be owners of 
productive capital enterprises are restrained by competition 
from charging exorbitant prices. Employees are paid 
competitive wages, and consumers are getting the most for 
their money; 
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3. The economy is operating with little or no unutilized capacity 
(so that there is no way of improving the economic condition 
of one person without redistributing from another); 
4. There are no barriers to becoming a producer and that all 
unemployment is voluntary; 
5.  All desired private-party transactions (such as those between 
employer and employee and those between producer and 
consumer) occur voluntarily; and, 
6. Distributions of wealth different from the one generated by 
the operation of the supppsedly efficient or nearly efficient 
market economy will not positively affect the size of the 
economic output and rather mght more likely reduce it. 
Conversely, if markets are not operating at perfect or near perfect 
efficiency, all of these implications are false, and the contrary implications 
carry with them substantial truth. For example, when the economy is 
operating with substantial unutilized capacity, (which, in the view of many 
socio-economists, is almost always the unacknowledged reality), this 
untapped capacity could be profitably employed (without redistribution) to 
provide food, clothing, shelter, healthcare, and other necessities that poor 
and working people lack. 
4. Maximizing the Total Societal Wealth as a Result of Maximizing 
Efficiency Is a Value to Be Weighed Separately Against Other 
Competing Values   
Having persuaded an alarming number of law teachers (particularly many 
at the twenty-five or so top ten American law schools) that the synthesis of 
the disciplines of law and economics provides a singular analysis that 
properly assumes that (1) the best starting point for legal analysis is one that 
counter-factually assumes market efficiency, (2) the maximization of 
efficiency has meaning independent of distribution, and (3) the 
maximization of efficiency is essentially synonymous with the 
maximization of wealth, advocates of the law and neoclassical economics 
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approach argue that efficiency is a separate value to be weighed along with 
other values (when in fact any measure of efficiency is inextricably 
connected with the promotion of other values). Moreover, taking the false 
posture of making a concession, some advocates of law and neoclassical 
economics readily agree that efficiency may be compromised by socially 
acceptable (e.g., democratic) means to serve other competing values, such 
as concerns for the needs of poor and working people that are not met with 
the operation of the assumed efficient market. 
This approach is seriously misleading because it ignores the facts that (1) 
maximizing efficiency does not necessarily or even probably maximize total 
societal wealth, (2) no measure of efficiency is independent of distribution, 
and (3) in the real-world inefficient markets, private, individual, group, 
organization, and government promotion of other values may increase total 
societal wealth by altering the distribution of wealth, irrespective of 
measures of efficiency. In other words, the widely accepted choice between 
(1) wealth maximization (and its false proxy efficiency maximization), and 
(2) other values is a false dichotomy. And the wide acceptance of this false 
dichotomy proves to be seductively pernicious because (1) it falsely implies 
that the pursuit of values other than efficiency compromises efficiency 
(which is taken as synonymous with total societal wealth), and (2) it lulls 
generations of the critics of law and neoclassical economics into fruitless, 
no-win attacks on points of dispute that obscure, rather than highlight, the 
critical interests and needs of poor and working people. 
Some of the critics have taken up the law and neoclassical economics 
invitation by explicitly or implicitly accepting their false wealth-
maximizing claims and arguing that other values are more important. By 
conceding the validity of the wealth-maximizing claims of efficiency 
analysis of law and neoclassical economics, the critics are betraying the 
interests of poor and working people, revealing exceptionally poor 
lawyering skills. To those critics, advocates for poor and working people 
might offer the adage given to every law student: don’t merely argue values 
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if you can first defeat your opponents on the facts. And among the 
economic facts that support the interests of poor and working people is the 
fact that distribution is important not only normatively, but also positively. 
Distributional issues concern not only how the pie is sliced and distributed, 
but also what kind of pie is made, how big it is, who is employed in the 
baking, and who participates in the ownership and profits of the bakery. 
Other critics of law and neoclassical economics have responded by 
wrongly conceding that maximizing efficiency does indeed maximize 
societal wealth, and then arguing that the measurements of wealth are 
inaccurate, biased, or not sufficiently inclusive. The upshot of this approach 
is to struggle to improve the measurements or include additional 
considerations, but to still leave poor and working people last in line after 
the more privileged market participants have gotten the best of the so-called 
voluntary transactions. 
Another group of critics of law and neoclassical economics have 
struggled mightily to beat the law and neoclassical economics proponents at 
their own deceptive game by showing with extremely sophisticated analysis 
that the opposite of law and economics rules actually promote more 
efficiency (and presumably, therefore, more wealth creation). These 
scholars sometimes (1) look at transactions costs, (2) invoke more 
sophisticated approaches to efficiency analysis (such as drawing upon the 
theory of second best),33 and/or (3) draw proof from behavioral psychology, 
sociology, or other disciplines and considerations to prove more efficient 
alternatives to laissez-faire ideology. These scholars occasionally win some 
battles (at least on paper), but they are left with the false notions that 
increasing neoclassical efficiency is the primary cause of economic growth 
and that there are no serious positive issues raised by excluding 
distributional issues from the analysis of wealth maximization. Indeed, it 
sometimes seems that proponents of the law and neoclassical economics 
approach will take up such “help the poor” battles to enhance the perceived 
power, value, and legitimacy of the law and neoclassical economics 
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approach by showing that it can be used to help the poor and working 
people when its overwhelming net effect on law and economic analysis is to 
betray their interests. 
Virtually all of these critics, like their law and neoclassical economics 
opponents, bow to the “God of Efficiency” as the sole or primary engine of 
growth, when at best it is the tail wagging the dog. 
To better serve the interests of poor and working people, I argue that the 
more effective, more scientific, more value conscious, more ethical, more 
holistic, more lawyerly approaches, and the approaches more consistent 
with good economics, are the socio-economic and binary approaches, which 
should replace the flawed law and neoclassical economic approach. These 
approaches are discussed in Parts III and IV below. 
III. SOCIO-ECONOMICS AS A MEANS OF BETTER SERVING THE 
INTERESTS OF POOR AND WORKING PEOPLE 
The purposes of this part are to convince readers that compared to the law 
and neoclassical approach, the socio-economic approach to law-related 
economic issues is a superior starting point for the legal analysis because it 
provides (1) a more rigorous and lawyerly approach, and (2) an approach 
that better serves the interests of poor and working people. If the socio-
economic approach can be convincingly shown to be superior to the law 
and neoclassical economic approach (which is inaccurately but widely 
understood and advanced in teaching and scholarship as the “law and 
neoclassical approach”),and (better yet) if the socio-economic approach 
eventually replaces the law and neoclassical economic approach as the 
generally preferred foundational starting point for analyzing law-related 
economic issues, then legal education and the interests of poor and working 
people would be greatly enhanced. If such a transformation were to occur, it 
would by no means eliminate neoclassical analysis from the approaches law 
teachers and lawyers might use because socio-economics by no means 
objects to such analysis when the proper foundation for its application is 
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laid. But the neoclassical approach would thereby no longer be the 
dominant foundational starting point for the analysis of law-related 
economic issues. My reason for writing this article and publishing it in this 
journal rests in part on my belief that critical scholars can be instrumental in 
bringing about this beneficial transformation. 
In urging that this transformation occur, I readily concede that legal 
education would also be enhanced if the dominant approach to law and 
economics adequately recognized one or more of the other minority 
approaches to law and economics mentioned above, such as institutional, 
behavioral, and feminist economics. Nevertheless, as explained more fully 
below, as a rigorous, positive, and normative approach to law-related 
economic issues, I believe that the socio-economics approach offers 
advantages to legal education that the mere broadening of law and 
economics does not offer. 
A. Background 
Although the term socio-economics has been used in many ways for over 
a century, as used in this article, it has a precise meaning: by way of 
overview, socio-economics is best understood as a broad, interdisciplinary 
approach grounded in the scientific method and moral philosophy that 
draws upon all disciplines relevant to the understanding of economic 
phenomena. It was first advanced in legal education in 1996 in a petition 
drafted by the author that was signed by over 120 law teachers from over 
fifty American law schools to establish the Section on Socio-Economics of 
the Association of American Law Schools.34 Since then it has been 
explicated in a number of articles and developed and applied in several law 
review symposia.35 A definitive description also appears in the 
Encyclopedia of Law and Society.36  
On the most general level, in addressing the interests of poor and working 
people, the superiority of the socio-economic approach as a positive and 
normative alternative to the law and neoclassical economics approach to 
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law-related economic issues is at least three-fold. First, it corrects a number 
of factual deficiencies in the law and neoclassical economics approach 
(including all those identified in Part II above) that result either from the 
way that approach is applied or from the fact that it is not supplemented 
with other schools of thought and other disciplines necessary to achieve an 
accurate understanding of law-related economic issues. Second, it properly 
identifies and brings to the surface of analysis important normative issues 
that the law and neoclassical economics approach, as widely practiced, 
tends to neglect or obscure.37 Third, it provides a constitution and a set of 
rules for fair analysis and advocacy in addressing law-related economic 
issues that is in harmony with holistic legal analysis and professional 
ethics.38 These points are developed more fully below. 
Because socio-economics analysis proceeds with a willingness to 
suspend the assumptions set forth above that are relied upon for neoclassical 
analysis, it adopts an analytical starting point regarding law-related 
economic issues that is more consistent with a lawyerly and scientific 
approach. A hallmark of legal and scientific analysis is the willingness to 
question basic assumptions rather than take them for granted and to suspend 
them in favor of other, sometimes conflicting, assumptions to explore their 
implications with an open mind. 
However, socio-economics does more than question and suspend 
underlying assumptions taken as truth by advocates of the neoclassical 
paradigm. Rather, based on principles of natural and moral philosophy 
relied upon by Adam Smith,39 and drawing upon all relevant disciplines, 
“socio-economics is a positive and normative approach that aspires to 
present a factually rigorous, holistic understanding of economic behavior 
that is both paradigm-conscious and value-conscious, yet at the same time, 
largely, though not entirely, paradigm- and value-neutral.” 40 
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B. Positive Aspects of Socio-Economics 
The positive aspects of socio-economics are grounded in the scientific 
method rather than any particular discipline within the social or natural 
sciences. The paradigm consciousness of socio-economics recognizes that 
the determination of facts depends on systemic rules (i.e., paradigms of 
analysis) for determining them.41 In socio-economics, the definitions, 
assumptions, logic, and applicability of paradigms are not taken for granted 
but are open to examination. It is in requiring a proper foundation before 
applying a paradigm (or a rule or statute) in context that vests socio-
economics and legal decision making with a high degree of paradigm-
neutrality. Paradigm-neutrality reflects a willingness to examine conflicting 
paradigms from a mutually agreed frame of reference. Complete paradigm-
neutrality would start with no foundational analytical principles except 
those agreed upon by the researchers. Thus, the paradigm-neutrality of 
socio-economics is subject to limitation. A commitment to logical 
coherence, inductive and deductive reasoning, empirical evidence, and the 
scientific method—i.e., a consideration of the extent to which particular 
paradigms are (1) based on reasonable, workable, testable assumptions; (2) 
internally consistent; and (3) useful in describing past events and predicting 
and influencing future events—as well as paradigm- and value-
consciousness, certainly does assume a basic approach to understanding.42 
Socio-economics is therefore not entirely paradigm-neutral. However, these 
foundational principles are very broad and inclusive. Apart from paradigm 
consciousness and value consciousness, these principles are shared by all of 
the natural and social sciences, the positive realm of philosophy, as well as 
the “fact” side of the legal analysis of “facts and values.” 
Being largely paradigm-neutral, socio-economics does not require the 
adoption of any particular school of economic thought. Whether 
neoclassical economics or another school of economics, or psychology, 
biology, political science, or some other expertise, or one or more of the 
sometimes conflicting schools of thought within an expertise are useful, will 
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depend on context. Only in limited contexts will a single discipline or 
school of thought tell the whole story, and neither law nor socio-economics 
is foundationally beholden to any one discipline. Thus, by virtue of its large 
degree of paradigm-neutrality, socio-economics does not exclude the 
positive analysis of any other discipline that might provide important 
insights regarding the analysis of law-related economic issues. 
Although it might be considered a new paradigm, socio-economics can 
also be “understood as a principled methodology, quite consistent with legal 
methodology, that is well suited to compare, critique, and employ different 
paradigms in particular contexts and for particular purposes.”43 As defined, 
socio-economics is therefore in harmony with legal decision making in that 
it requires judgment to be based on general rules applied to particular 
circumstances in relevant context by way of a process that is due. Thus, like 
legal decision making, socio-economic analysis requires a proper 
foundation upon which to employ a particular discipline in specific contexts 
while disregarding alternative approaches that lead to different conclusions. 
Moreover, because it is an interdisciplinary approach founded on the 
scientific method, socio-economics is not burdened by the prejudicial 
credentialism, which sometimes hinders the appreciation of important 
insights that are based on analytical approaches from outside the borders of 
a particular discipline. Thus, one need not be an economist to be a 
socio-economist. Like a competent lawyer, the competent socio-economist 
can competently rely on the expertise of other professionals. Therefore, 
people from a broad spectrum of disciplines and economic persuasions can 
be socio-economists. Nevertheless, in a positive sense, good socio-
economics requires “good economics,” just as it requires “good logic” and 
“good science.” 
Being largely paradigm and value neutral, socio-economics does not 
generally require specific conclusions regarding controversies, problems, or 
solutions. Therefore, socio-economists may or may not agree on the 
comparison, critique, or employment of one or more paradigms within a 
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particular context; but with a socio-economic foundation, the substance of 
the agreements and disagreements that unite and divide them are better 
understood. Thus, the socio-economic approach provides an inclusive, 
intellectual foundation on which a diverse array of disciplines, and schools 
of thought within disciplines, can contribute to understanding, and on which 
a broad spectrum of people can beneficially participate with mutual respect 
for their disparate methodologies. 
C. The Normative Aspects of Socio-Economics 
The foregoing discussion of the positive aspects of socio-economics 
includes several references to “good” as used in a “positive” or “factual” 
sense. For example, given the widely accepted “paradigm” of arithmetic, 
the assertion that “two plus two equals four” is “factually,” “good 
arithmetic;” whereas “two plus two equals five” is “bad arithmetic.” In a 
different mathematical system, the opposite might be true. These judgments 
are factual, not normative. There may or may not be something normatively 
good or bad about these statements; socio-economics holds that 
practitioners of its methodology should be conscious of normative aspects 
of the positive paradigms they employ. Thus socio-economists do not 
suggest that their approach is entirely value neutral, or “purely scientific.” 
Moreover, socio-economics reflects a normative commitment to do good 
research that does good: research that will make a positive difference in the 
world.44 Like the good lawyer, the good socio-economist must distinguish 
between the important issues and those that are less important, and devote 
time and attention accordingly. But this commitment to focus on the good 
and important does not require specific agreement as to what is good and 
important and what research will do important good. Such considerations 
are left to the individual conscience. Thus, socio-economics is said to be 
both value-conscious and yet largely value neutral.45 Beyond its 
commitment to the good and the important, socio-economics is value-
conscious in several additional respects. It requires a recognition that values 
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(1) are implicit in paradigms, (2) affect economic behavior, and (3) may 
affect behavior in ways that frequently cannot be reduced to discreet 
variables.46 
D. Socio-Economics as it Relates to Efficiency, Wealth Distribution, and 
Growth 
Notwithstanding the fact that socio-economics is largely paradigm 
neutral, implicit in the socio-economic approach is the proposition that the 
distribution of wealth, opportunities, and risks can matter significantly both 
normatively and positively in terms of efficiency and wealth maximization. 
“Consequently, in many important contexts, (1) distributional 
considerations must not be excluded from the positive aspects of economic 
analysis, (2) distributional issues cannot be treated as purely exogenous 
factors, and (3) distribution cannot be assumed to be determined by factors 
of marginal productivity.”47 As in law, in socio-economics distributional 
issues are inherent in the positive as well as the normative analysis. 
According to the socio-economic approach, efficiency “maximization 
cannot be understood entirely or even primarily in terms of marginal 
efficiency analysis without reference to the socio-economic context, 
including social institutions, changing technology, nature, race, class, 
gender, and the distribution of wealth, power, opportunities, and risks along 
with their effects over time.”48 Moreover, although agreeing with 
neoclassical economics that prices affect distribution, socio-economists give 
equal representation to the fact that distribution also affects prices.49 
Therefore, contrary to the one-sided neoclassical approach that prevails in 
much of the law- and neoclassical-economics literature and teaching, socio-
economics holds that “there is no single well-defined goal of optimal 
efficiency at any point in time to guide legal decision making that is 
independent of distribution.”50 
More importantly, socio-economists recognize (1) that the neoclassical 
approach to efficiency is not a general theory of growth and wealth 
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maximization (as it is falsely advanced by many who espouse principles of 
law and neoclassical economics in many educational, political, and social 
contexts), and (2) that wealth maximization cannot be understood entirely 
or even primarily in terms of efficiency maximization.51 The accumulating 
wealth of nations (the focus of Adam Smith’s inquiry) is not synonymous 
with the “efficiency” that is advanced as a proxy for wealth maximization in 
the law- and neoclassical-economics literature. 
E. Socio-Economics in Legal Education 
Thus, socio-economics offers a specific, lawyerly, foundational approach 
to rules of intellectual rigor, honesty, and fair play related to economic 
issues of fact and value. Until its formulation, adoption, and growing 
acceptance, such a systemic approach has been lacking within legal 
education. Trenchant criticism regarding the harms and shortcomings of the 
law and economic approach from critical scholars, feminists, and others 
have been ably advanced and well-received, and they will find a welcome 
home resting on the socio-economic foundation. But until the emergence of 
socio-economics as a school of thought, within the realm of legal analysis 
explicitly related to law-related economic issues, such critiques will not be 
supported by a comprehensive foundation that offers not only an explicit 
value-consciousness and commitment to enhancing justice grounded in 
moral philosophy, but also a solid foundation of economic principles based 
on the scientific method. The indispensable need for a proper foundation for 
the analysis of law-related economic issues is, therefore, an essential 
premise of socio-economics. 
Although some of the benefits of adopting the socio-economic approach 
can be derived from merely broadening the dominant school of law and 
economics to include other schools of economic thought, advocates for poor 
and working people (indeed for all people and institutions) need a more 
rigorous and comprehensive approach. In this regard, there is an important 
congruence between the socio-economic approach and good lawyering. 
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Like the good socio-economists, the good lawyer is not beholden to any one 
discipline or school of thought. Both methodologies are inherently inclusive 
of all relevant information. In harmony with socio-economics, professional 
ethics require good lawyers to draw on all relevant disciplines (both positive 
and normative) when serving their clients. Addressing law-related economic 
issues cannot be limited to law and economics but requires an integration of 
all relevant positive and normative understanding.  
Because of its broad and inclusive approach, socio-economics might be 
characterized in conversations as a “big tent.” The inclusive spirit in which 
this visual metaphor is offered is welcome, but in truth it is somewhat 
misleading. Lawyers do not make arguments and introduce supporting 
evidence under a big tent. The law requires a proper foundation; and that is 
what socio-economics provides with respect to law-related economic issues. 
Based on the foregoing, I submit that legal education and the interests of 
poor and working people would be enhanced if the socio-economic 
approach were to become as widely understood and advanced in teaching 
and scholarship as the law and neoclassical approach, and (better yet) if the 
socio-economic approach eventually replaces the law and neoclassical 
approach as the generally preferred foundational starting point for analyzing 
law-related economic issues.52 
Like legal realism, critical legal studies, Critical Race Theory, feminism, 
and law and economics, socio-economics is a distinct school of thought. 
Unlike these other schools, which have long been recognized in books and 
scholarship on jurisprudence, socio-economics is just beginning to receive 
recognition in jurisprudence.53 Nevertheless, its recognition and influence 
are growing. A number of scholars identified with the critical schools are 
authors of books and scholarship on jurisprudence. It is my hope that they 
will include socio-economics as a school of thought worthy of mention in 
their books, scholarship, and teaching, as for example, Professor’s Christie 
and Martin have done.54 As socio-economics becomes more widely 
appreciated and accepted as an alternative approach to the analysis of law-
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related issues, the interests of poor and working people will become 
progressively better served, and the goals of the LatCrit movement will be 
more fully realized. Critical scholars would better serve their goals by 
advancing socio-economics as the proper foundational starting point for the 
analysis of law-related economic issues rather than the approach 
characterized by law and neoclassical economics.55 
IV. BINARY ECONOMICS AS A MEANS OF BETTER SERVING THE 
INTERESTS OF POOR AND WORKING PEOPLE 
One inclusive approach to economic theory that is not yet widely 
understood, but that is receiving increasing attention among socio-
economists and other thoughtful scholars is binary economics.56 Like the 
broader field of socio-economics, binary economics holds that distribution 
affects economic outcomes both normatively and positively. From the 
perspective of serving the interests of poor and working people, it is the 
positive impact that distribution has on both the magnitude and composition 
of economic production and consumption that most significantly 
distinguishes both socio-economics and binary economics from the 
neoclassical approach. 
However, binary economics goes further than the more general socio-
economic approach, because it focuses on one distributional issue that is 
ignored by virtually all other schools of economic thought (including the 
ones noted in Part II above), namely, the distribution of capital acquisition 
and ownership and its crucial relation to wealth maximization, economic 
prosperity, and justice for all people. To the extent that they are concerned 
with the distribution of income, the other economic approaches place 
virtually their entire emphasis on the distribution of jobs, wages, education, 
and welfare to assist poor and working people; whereas, binary economics 
addresses the distribution of income by revealing an additional legitimate 
interest of poor and working people which places great emphasis on 
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enabling all people (not merely well-capitalized people) to acquire capital 
with the earnings of capital. 
In theory, although all people in a market economy (either individually or 
via agents) are able to acquire capital with the earnings of capital, reliable 
empirical data reveals that as a practical matter, the major determinant in 
the ability of individuals to acquire capital with the earnings of capital is the 
existing distribution of capital ownership.57 Binary economic analysis 
reveals (1) that the same institutions that enable well-capitalized people to 
acquire capital with the earnings of capital can be opened to all people, and 
(2) as capital acquisition with the earnings of capital is increasingly made 
available to poor and working people, both their individual wealth and total 
societal wealth increases. With an opening of the market institutions, poor 
and working people will be able to earn not only by laboring, but 
increasingly by owning; and their earning capacity (enhanced by their 
ownership of productive capital) will promote the profitable employment of 
additional productive capacity and promote a growing economy that 
benefits all people. 
The institutions that would be opened more democratically to all people 
are (1) the system of corporate finance, (2) the institution of fiduciary trusts, 
(3) capital-credit bank lending, (4) private capital-credit insurance and 
reinsurance, (5) government insurance and reinsurance, and (6) central bank 
(Federal Reserve) monetization. It should be noted that all of these 
institutions are presently functioning, and major corporations, fiduciaries, 
lenders, insurers, and the government heavily rely upon them; and there is 
no indication that this reliance will stop any time soon. In response to the 
global economic recession that began in 2008, the strengthening of these 
institutions was central to the government’s efforts to promote economic 
recovery. However, without a binary economics understanding, these 
governmental actions will simply enable people to acquire capital with the 
earnings of capital roughly in proportion to their existing ownership, 
thereby exacerbating the unequal distribution of wealth and leaving poor 
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and working people scrambling and competing among themselves for jobs  
(but generally not the best jobs) and welfare redistribution. 
Before proceeding further, it should be noted that although binary 
economics has found a welcome home within socio-economics, because 
socio-economics is always open to new ways of understanding economic 
phenomena, binary economics, nevertheless, has validity independent of 
socio-economic methodology and should be of interest to all economists, 
lawyers, and others concerned with matters of growth, efficiency, and 
distribution, whether or not they accept the socio-economic methodology. 
In an important sense, therefore, this article is in reality two articles 
combined as one. 
A. Basic Premises of Binary Economics58 
Binary economics can be distinguished from Adam Smith’s classical 
economics and other economic schools by the following related 
propositions: 
1. Labor and capital are equally fundamental independent or 
binary factors of (or inputs to) production.    
2. Technology makes capital much more productive than labor. 
3. The principle of binary growth: Capital has a strong, positive, 
distributive relationship to growth, such that the more 
broadly capital is acquired, the more it can be profitably 
employed to increase output. 
As used in binary theory, capital includes land, tools, animals, machines, 
structures, patents, copyrights, and other intangibles—anything capable of 
being owned by another and producing wealth and therefore income. 
Capital does not include what is sometimes called “financial capital,” which 
binary economics analyzes as a participation in the earnings of capital (i.e., 
a property right in capital). Capital also does not include “human capital,” 
which binary economics analyzes as a function of labor. 
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As explained more fully below, each of these propositions runs contrary 
to Adam Smith’s analysis. Although he did not use the word “technology,” 
according to Smith, (1) labor is the fundamental source of production and 
growth, (2) technological advances in capital make labor more productive, 
and (3) the distribution of capital ownership has no fundamental, strong, 
positive relationship to economic growth. 
B. Binary Growth 
The most important contribution of binary economics to the interests of 
poor and working people is the principle of binary growth. The principle of 
binary growth is a potent distributive relationship between capital 
acquisition and growth.59 As a fundamental economic principle, it is unique 
to binary economics.60 It is not found in any writing in the economic 
literature or otherwise that is not traceable to the work of Louis Kelso, who 
originated the theory. Promoting the broader understanding of the principle 
of binary growth will serve the interests of poor and working people, 
because it reveals a win-win strategy of how to economically empower 
them. It reveals a wholly voluntary market means of enriching poor and 
working people and increasing growth and economic opportunity for all 
people without redistributing anything from existing owners. 
This understanding reveals that major corporations in the U.S., and 
around the world, have a natural interest in expanding their share ownership 
in ways that will not only enrich their employees, their customers, and their 
neighbors (people who live and work near their facilities), but also 
substantially increases the value of their shares for existing shareholders 
(both individuals and institutional investors representing employees of 
private companies, governments, and others).61 It also reveals how 
principles of binary economics can be used to promote ways to address past 
injustices by way of reparations.62 A step-by-step description of how major 
corporations could enhance their profitability by broadening their 
ownership in a binary economy can be found in the reference cited below.63 
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One great benefit of the binary approach is that it clearly reveals that 
economic and personal empowerment derived from the ownership of 
productive capital (which is not realistically achievable in an industrial 
economy by most people with only labor earning power): (1) can be 
achieved by enabling them to acquire capital with the earnings of capital, 
and (2) this enabling empowerment of poor and working people will make 
the employment of more capital and labor more profitable for everyone. 
Thus, to serve the interests of poor and working people, it is not enough to 
ask them to consider the size of the pie without considering who gets to 
participate in the ownership of the bakery. The empowering issue of the 
distribution of capital acquisition is of crucial importance to poor and 
working people but is entirely obscured by the abuse of the neoclassical 
paradigm.64 
The logic supporting the binary property/economic paradigm indicates 
that the voluntary operation of an ownership-broadening economy (which 
would gradually result from opening to all people the six institutions by 
which capital is presently acquired primarily with the earnings of capital) 
provides not only a broader distribution of wealth and income, but also 
substantially more real growth than would a traditional economy. This logic 
is explained more fully by the following three propositions: 
1. Because demand for capital investment is dependent on 
demand for consumer goods in a future period, a voluntary 
pattern of steadily broadening ownership promises more 
production-based consumer demand in future years and 
therefore more demand for the employment of labor and 
capital in earlier years. 
2. A broader distribution of capital acquisition, ownership, and 
income strengthens the promise of capital to pay for itself out 
of its future earnings and makes profitable the employment of 
more (and increasingly more productive) capital. 
3. If members of the poor and middle classes are enabled to 
compete with existing owners for the acquisition of corporate 
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stock representing the capital requirements of companies 
worthy of prime credit, they would bring to the bargaining 
table a chip not possessed by existing owners: a pent up 
appetite for the necessities and simple luxuries of life that the 
rich have long enjoyed from capital income. After the 
acquisition debt obligations have been satisfied, the earnings 
of capital acquired by members of the poor and middle class 
will create more production-based consumer demand than if 
that capital had been acquired by the rich. In contrast, if 
acquired by the rich, most of the capital earnings would seek 
investment opportunities but in the context of weaker 
consumer demand. 
C. Labor, Capital, Production and Growth: Conventional Productivity 
Compared with Binary Productiveness 
In order to understand how the principle of binary growth differs 
theoretically from the foundational understanding of growth articulated by 
Adam Smith—and followed by virtually all other economists since—it is 
necessary to compare Smith’s understanding of the role of labor and capital 
in the production of goods, services, and growth with the binary 
understanding. This in turn requires a comparison of the conventional 
“productivity” with binary “productiveness.” 
According to Adam Smith, the primary role of capital (which implicitly 
he regarded as embodying know-how or technology) is to increase labor 
productivity.65 Karl Marx, Alfred Marshall (widely credited for neoclassical 
economics), and J.M. Keynes did not disagree. Indeed, in his General 
Theory, Keynes distilled the economy to three fundamental, independent 
variables: time, money, and labor. Like Smith, Keynes treated capital as a 
dependent variable.66 In binary economics, labor and capital are equally 
fundamental and independent variables because both do work.67 
According to the binary view of production, although labor and capital 
may cooperate (just as people may cooperate) to do work, each factor does 
its own work by providing its own productiveness, thereby earning its own 
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income. To understand the binary approach, it is important to distinguish 
between productivity (which is the ratio of the output of all factors of 
production, divided by the input of one factor, usually labor) and 
productiveness (a special focus of binary economics, which retrospectively 
means work done and prospectively means productive capacity). 
The independent productiveness of labor and capital can be illustrated by 
considering any sort of work. Consider, for example, the work of sawing 
boards and hauling sacks. A person can saw ten boards per hour with a 
handsaw, and one hundred boards per hour with a machine saw. According 
to conventional economic analysis, compared to working with the handsaw, 
with the machine saw the worker can saw ten times as many boards in the 
same time. Thus, the worker is said to have ten times the productivity as 
compared to working with the handsaw. However, when sawing each board 
with the help of the machine saw, the worker is doing much less work. 
Consequently, per unit of output, the labor contribution to the production of 
sawed boards has decreased. From a binary perspective, the worker is 
contributing no more than ten percent of the productiveness that was 
required to work with the handsaw, and the machine saw is doing 
essentially all of the extra work. 
The independent productiveness of capital is more clearly revealed in the 
work hauling sacks: (1) a person can haul one sack, one mile, in one hour, 
and is exhausted, (2) with a horse, ten sacks can be hauled four times as far 
(yielding a forty-fold increase in output), and (3) with a truck, five hundred 
sacks can be hauled forty times as far (yielding a twenty thousand-fold 
increase in output). According to the binary perspective, the horse and truck 
are doing essentially all of the extra work.68  
D. The Six Powers of Capital 
Based on its independent productiveness, capital has six powers 
important to production, distribution, and growth which are entirely 
obscured by the conventional economic paradigm.69 Capital can: 
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1. Replace labor (by doing what was formerly done by labor); 
2. Vastly supplement the work of labor by doing the kind of 
work that humans can do; 
3. Do work that labor alone can never do (e.g., automatic 
elevators lift hundreds of feet in seconds, airplanes fly, fruit 
trees make fruit—while all farmers can do is assist in the 
process); 
4. Work without labor (as in the case of washing machines, 
automatic bank tellers, gasoline dispensers, vending 
machines, automated factories, and fruit-bearing trees); 
5. Pay for itself out of its future earnings (the basic rule of 
business investment); and 
6. Distribute income necessary to purchase its output. 
Each of these powers, when actually reflected in production, contributes 
to growth (including mere labor replacement, which produces the same 
physical output, plus leisure for the owner of the capital), but only the first 
power directly involves the mere substitution of capital for labor. Thus, 
although many economists and policy advocates abuse the marginal 
efficiency theory of neoclassical economics by advancing it as the 
foundation for (or the primary component of) a general theory of wealth 
maximization and growth, the capital/labor substitution process is only one 
component of growth (operating after the creation of greatly increased 
productive capacity). From the binary perspective, as explained in Part IV-
F, the wealth-enhancing contributions of market pricing and resource 
allocation are severely limited so long as the distribution of capital 
acquisition remains narrow. 
E. The Independent Productiveness and Power of Labor and Capital 
Some people object to the notion of “independent” capital productiveness 
and the notion that capital has six independent powers that contribute 
directly to growth in ways not caused by increasing human productivity. 
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Their thinking is influenced by the almost universally shared economic 
approach, articulated by Adam Smith, that the primary role of capital is to 
increase labor productivity, and increasing labor productivity is the primary 
cause of per capita growth. These people observe that any work done by 
capital depends on antecedent or concurrent work of human beings (labor). 
For example, it takes the person to lead the horse; drive the truck; fly the 
airplane; invent, build, operate, and repair the machines and robots, etc. One 
problem with this objection is that, in this sense, nothing is independent and 
no person’s labor is independent because no person exists without the 
antecedent work of others and the natural bounty that supported their 
ancestors. So we might as well eliminate "independent” from the English 
language because nothing is independent. There is another sense in which 
the work of capital and labor is not independent, because they each have 
value relative to one another, and markets exist wherein market participants 
can express how they value one relative to the other. However, in this sense, 
no good and no factor of production are independent of other goods and 
factors in terms of their relative value. But the concept of independence 
does have significance in an economic sense that is explained more fully 
below. 
The “independent” in “independent productiveness” merely requires 
recognition that both the human and the non-human factors do work 
independent of the increasing productivity of the other factor. 
Mathematically, this means treating labor and capital as independent 
variables. Compared to the conventional economic approach employed by 
both Adam Smith and J.M. Keynes, (which treats capital as a dependent 
variable and labor as the only independent), the binary approach treats 
capital and labor as independent (i.e., binary) productive variables. 
Thus, with the binary approach, the concept of independent 
productiveness does not negate the fact that in many instances both capital 
and labor are generally needed to complete specific kinds of work, or the 
fact that labor is needed to conceive of, design, create, operate, maintain, 
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store, and repair capital. But the work of conceiving, designing, creating, 
operating, maintaining, storing, and repairing capital is not the work of the 
capital conceived, designed, created, operated, maintained, stored, and 
repaired. Thus, although it takes a person to lead the horse, the work of 
leading is not the work of hauling. If, instead of leading a horse, the leader 
led ten people each carrying one sack, who would deny the independent 
work (productiveness) of each of the ten human haulers merely because 
someone is leading them? Likewise, while it takes a person to operate the 
handsaw and machine saw, and no boards would be sawed without the 
worker, it is also true that no boards could be sawed without a saw. There is 
now automated machinery that can saw a great number of boards in a 
comparatively short period of time with virtually no human input. 
Nor does the binary approach contradict the fact that capital and labor 
have market value relative to each other (and are in this sense not 
:independent just as the value everything has a relation to the value of every 
other thing).  However, the relative value of things depends on the 
distribution of capital acquisition which can only be comprehended if 
capital is treated as an independent variable, as explained in Part IV-F 
below. 
F. Productiveness, Prices, Values, and Efficiency 
A broader distribution of capital acquisition also affects price and value. 
As long as most people derive little or no income from capital acquisition, 
most consumer goods will be worth the work people are willing to do to 
acquire them. However, people can express value not only by the work they 
do, but also by the work they let their capital do. Compared to the person 
with no horse, the person who owns a horse finds many more sacks are 
worth hauling; and the economy of sack hauling will grow as horse (and 
truck) acquisition becomes more broadly distributed. In an economy in 
which the institutions that facilitate capital acquisition with the earnings of 
capital are opened more broadly, the value of goods is not limited to the 
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work people are willing and able to do by way of their labor, but also 
includes the work they are willing and able to let their capital do. 
Moreover, the willingness of laborers to work at a given wage depends 
on their competitive opportunity to acquire capital with their earnings and 
then receive its full net return. Accordingly, (1) the technical relationship 
used in the theory of marginal productivity that governs conventional 
understanding of the relative employment of capital and labor in production, 
and (2) the factor income shares derived from production are significantly 
dependent on the distribution of capital acquisition with the earnings of 
capital. From a conventional economic perspective—in terms of its impact 
on pricing, capital/labor substitution, employment, and factor income 
shares—the distribution of capital acquisition is either irrelevant or of only 
minor consequence. 
G.  Productiveness, the Distribution of Earning Capacity, and Growth 
In their book Economics Explained: Everything You Need to Know About 
How the Economy Works and Where Its Going, Nobel Laureate Robert 
Heilbroner and Lester Thurow (then Chair of Economics at M.I.T.), present 
data from which they conclude that, between 1860 and 1980, production in 
the U.S. increased 600 percent per capita.70 And the economy has grown 
even more per capita since then. But were people really doing six times as 
much work in 1980 as they did in 1860? Are people really doing more than 
six times as much work today? Or is it capital that is doing ever more of the 
work per unit of production? These are questions that poor and working 
people and their advocates must ask and answer if their economic strategies 
are to conform to reality. 
When analyzing how production and productive capacity have grown 
with advancing technology, conventional market economics interprets the 
role of capital as merely facilitative; capital increases human productivity, 
thereby allowing for a rise in output per unit of labor, higher wages, and the 
employment of more labor.71 According to binary economics, however, in 
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contributing to economic growth, capital does much more than increase the 
productivity of the people who work with it; increasingly, capital is doing 
more of the work. The economic imperative is generally to produce more 
with more productive capital and less labor. Although technological 
advance may be seen to concentrate higher productivity into fewer workers, 
as a general rule the primary effect of technological advancer (per unit of 
output and in the aggregate) is to make capital more productive than labor 
and thereby to replace and vastly supplement the productiveness of labor 
with ever greater capital productiveness.72 
Moreover, because capital is independently productive, it works on both 
sides of the production-consumption economic equation by providing vastly 
increased (1) productive capacity and production, and (2) capacity to 
distribute income and leisure. According to binary economists, in a private 
property, market economy, it is the capacity of capital both to do more work 
and to distribute more income and leisure which explains how broadening 
capital ownership promotes greater employment of existing capacity, capital 
accumulation, and growth.73 Thus, from a binary perspective, growth is 
primarily the result of increasing capital productiveness and the distribution 
of its ownership rather than increasing labor productivity. 
From a binary perspective, the recognition that capital productiveness is 
increasing relative to labor productiveness, so that capital is doing ever 
more of the work and has the capacity to distribute ever more income per 
capita, leads to several important insights that are important to poor and 
working people. 
First, as capital both replaces and vastly supplements labor to increase 
economic output with relatively decreasing labor per unit of output, labor’s 
relative claim on total output tends to decrease so that exclusive reliance on 
increased jobs and wages is an increasingly inadequate way to earn a living. 
Second, as production becomes more capital intensive, most people will 
not be able to preserve and enhance their earning capacity relative to what 
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an economy can produce unless they supplement their labor earning 
capacity with capital earning capacity. 
In light of the fact that (1) the distribution of future earning capacity is an 
essential motivating ingredient for the creation of present productive 
capacity, and (2) the productive power of capital produces and distributes 
ever more income and leisure, indicates that the capital that buys itself for 
well-capitalized people can buy itself even more profitably if all people are 
included in the process of capital acquisition. 
H. Choosing Which Law and Economic Theories to Teach 
The essence of the adversary system is that there is always more than one 
way to look at things. One might say that the growth is caused by increasing 
labor productivity, by increasing capital productiveness, or by a 
combination of both. One might say that the ways to address the economic 
needs of poor and working people are jobs, welfare, and education; or one 
might say that capital acquisition with the earnings of capital is also very 
important and should not be excluded from the priorities. Which way of 
understanding is more helpful to the interests of poor and working people? 
Which way reveals more clearly what poor and working people need not 
only to survive but to flourish? Economists Heilbroner and Thurow 
marketed their book with the subtitle “Everything You Need to Know About 
How the Economy Works and Where It’s Going,” and they discuss 
extensively the problems of poverty and income distribution, but they make 
no reference to the economic importance or consequences of the distribution 
of capital acquisition with the earnings of capital.74 The same is true of all 
but a handful of economists throughout the world. 
The conventional productivity view suggests that the solution to the need 
to earn enough to survive and raise a family is increased jobs and wages, 
and, if necessary, welfare. But although the privileged and some of the 
lucky may flourish, the binary view suggests that jobs, wages, and welfare 
will never distribute enough income to most poor and working people 
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because the purpose of technological advance is to squeeze labor out of 
production, and that only the acquisition of capital can distribute the earning 
capacity and the leisure that was the promise of the industrial revolution. 
With the advent of increasingly productive capital, jobs are eliminated. The 
promise of other jobs created by technological advance will also dry up 
with yet more technological advance. In an economy characterized by 
accelerating technological advance, competing for earning capacity via 
labor alone is like competing with horses and trucks for hauling. The elite, 
along with some of the strongest and brightest, may flourish in such an 
economy, but most people will not. As production becomes ever more 
capital intensive, the way in which every person participates in production 
must also become capital intensive, not only by laboring, but increasingly 
by acquiring capital with the earnings of capital. 
So what is the solution? Promote capital investment so that the benefits 
will trickle down, as the neoclassical paradigms on the right suggest? Press 
for increased jobs, wages, and welfare as those on the Keynesian-left 
suggest? Eliminate capitalism as Marx and others suggest?  Or open to 
people as practical matter the right to acquire capital with the earnings of 
capital as the binary view suggests? Inasmuch as the neoclassical, 
Keynesian, and socialist approaches are widely taught and discussed in 
policy analysis, is there any good reason to exclude the binary alternative 
from virtually all economic and legal scholarship that address issues of 
economic efficiency, growth, distribution, poverty, and justice? 
I. Binary Economics Reveals a Concrete Plan of Action for Poor and 
Working People  
The binary approach is not just an academic theory sympathetic to poor 
and working people, rich in feel-good rhetoric but poor in practical 
application. It reveals a concrete strategy that could be practically 
employed, without redistribution, for the benefit of poor and working 
people. To help promote economic recovery following the global recession 
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that began in 2008, this strategy is already being applied by private 
companies—with substantial aid from the government—to facilitate capital 
acquisition primarily for rich people and with relatively little benefit for 
poor and working people.75 
The logic underlying the principle of binary growth (i.e., capital-
ownership distribution-based growth) can be understood and implemented 
by considering the three thousand largest companies in the U.S., and then 
focusing on a subset comprised of prime credit-worthy companies. Most of 
these companies exhibit the frustrating essence of underutilized productive 
capacity. At diminishing unit costs, they can produce much more of the 
goods and services people need and want. However, the consumer earning 
capacity to render more production profitable, even at diminishing unit 
costs, is lacking. 
As noted above, presently, almost all new capital is acquired with the 
earnings of capital and much of it is acquired with borrowed money. The 
ownership of this corporate wealth is highly concentrated, so that 
approximately 1 percent of the people own 40–50 percent of the wealth and 
10 percent own 90 percent of the wealth, leaving 90 percent of people 
owning little or none. Thus, capital returns its value at a rate reflective of its 
long-term (suppressed) earning capacity as it buys itself for a small minority 
of the population. 
If the techniques presently used to enable existing owners to acquire 
capital using earnings of capital were opened competitively to all people, 
then in an economy with underutilized productive capacity the demand for 
capital investment would increase as its income is increasingly distributed 
to would-be consumers with unsatisfied needs and wants. 
To acquire capital with the earnings of capital, well-capitalized people 
use (1) the pre-tax earnings of capital, (2) collateral, (3) capital acquisition 
credit, (4) market and insurance mechanisms to diversify and reduce risk, 
and (5) a monetary policy intended to protect private property. The same 
institutions and practices that work profitably for well-capitalized people 
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can also work profitably for all people. In an economy operating at less than 
full capacity, if capital can competitively pay for its acquisition costs out of 
its future earnings for existing owners, it can do so even more profitably if 
all people are included in the acquisition process. 
Accordingly, to enable all people and major, prime, credit corporations to 
capitalize on the potent distributive relationship between voluntary 
ownership-broadening capital acquisition and growth, a binary economy 
requires only modest reforms to open the market infrastructure governing 
corporate finance so that everyone is vested with competitive capital 
acquisition rights to acquire capital with the earnings of capital. 
As shown in the General Theory Diagram below, structure of a binary 
economy can be modeled with six basic institutions: (1) Prime Credit-
Worthy Corporations, (2) Capital Ownership-Broadening Trusts, (3) Banks, 
(4) Private Capital Credit Insurers, (5) the Capital Diffusion Reinsurance 
Corporation (the only new entity, modeled after the Federal Housing 
Administration), and (6) the Central Bank (Federal Reserve). 
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Figure 1: General Theory Diagram 
 
In a binary economy, in addition to their usual means of acquiring capital 
assets (borrowing, retained earnings, and sale of shares), prime credit-
worthy corporations could raise the funds to acquire capital assets by selling 
special full-dividend common shares to a capital ownership-broadening 
trust for the benefit of employees, customers, neighbors, and others, paid for 
with a bank loan to the trust, insured by a private capital credit-insurer and 
government reinsurer, and discounted at a rate of 99.75 percent by the 
Federal Reserve (with 0.25 percent reflecting its estimated administrative 
cost). Once the capital acquisition loan repayment obligations are met, the 
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full net capital earnings (net of reserves for depreciation, research, and 
development) would be paid to the binary owners to help them meet their 
needs and wants and to provide the basis for increased investment, 
employment, and production.76 
According to binary theory, the more broadly capital is acquired in 
voluntary market transactions, the faster an economy, and large 
corporations within that economy, will grow. More broadly distributed 
capital acquisition will: 
1. Distribute more consumer demand, thereby enhancing the 
market for goods and services; 
2. Profitably employ more underutilized capacity (both capital 
and labor); 
3. Increase capital investment; 
4. Accelerate technological advance; 
5. Provide additional financial capital for entrepreneurial 
enterprises; 
6. Enhance employee productivity, consumer loyalty, and 
general goodwill among neighbors of participating 
companies and the general population; 
7. Reduce the need for taxation, other forms of redistribution, 
and associated transactions costs; 
8. Enhance general wealth of most major corporations, their 
shareholders, and the general population; 
9. Broaden, deepen, and more fully democratize the institution 
of private property by opening its benefits to more people; 
and 
10. Strengthen political democracy by opening capital 
acquisition with the earnings of capital to more people.77 
Although government assistance to private companies, banks, capital 
credit insurers (such as AIG), and quasi-public capital credit insurers (such 
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as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), and generous federal reserve 
monetization to extend competitive capital acquisition rights more broadly 
to include poor and working people may be seen as politically impractical, 
it is essentially what is now being done for the capital acquisition rights of 
richer people. The most significant difference is that poor and working 
people are being unnecessarily excluded; and tragically, they and most of 
their advocates do not understand that their exclusion is thwarting economic 
recovery and that their inclusion would aid it. 
Unfortunately, at present, the vast majority of lawyers, law teachers, and 
law students committed to the interests of poor and working people seem 
wholly unaware that the right to acquire capital with the earnings of capital 
might be the subject of advocacy. Although the concepts underlying binary 
economics were first published over fifty years ago, generations of students 
of law, economics, and other relevant disciplines continue to graduate with 
no exposure to those concepts. Reform of the curriculum in law, economics, 
and other disciplines within colleges, universities, business schools, and law 
schools is therefore a matter of urgent concern. Critical scholars could do a 
great deal to correct this deficiency in education. 
V. LEARNING, TEACHING, EMPLOYING AND PROMOTING SOCIO-
ECONOMICS AND BINARY ECONOMICS 
So, what can LatCrit scholars who are seriously committed to the welfare 
of poor and working people do to assist them in achieving greater economic 
understanding and empowerment? One answer is to learn, teach, employ, 
and promote socio-economics and binary economics. 
By learning, teaching, employing, and promoting the principles of socio-
economics as a foundationally holistic, value-conscious, factually accurate 
method of analyzing law-related economic issues and by teaching it to 
others and promoting its acceptance ever more broadly in legal education, 
LatCrit scholars can better serve the interests of poor and working people 
by hastening the time when socio-economics entirely supplants the 
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prevailing law and neoclassical economics approach to such issues. As 
noted above, the widespread acceptance of the socio-economic approach 
will not eliminate the useful application of neoclassical economics when the 
proper foundation is laid for its application, but it will prevent its 
application in contexts where it should not be applied. The widespread 
acceptance of the socio-economic approach will also facilitate the proper 
application of other schools of economics and other disciplines as necessary 
to competently represent clients. 
By learning, teaching, employing, and promoting the broader acceptance 
of binary economics among legal educations, LatCrit scholars can better 
serve the interests of poor and working people by helping them and their 
advocates to identify and secure a crucial property right that they need to 
flourish in a market economy.  Promoting their widespread understanding 
of binary economics will hasten the time when the institutions of corporate 
finance, banking, insurance, government loans and guaranties, and 
monetary policy (the very institutions presently relied upon by well-
capitalized people to acquire capital with the earnings of capital) can be 
practically opened to poor and working people. With that opening, the right 
to acquire capital with the earnings of capital can be more broadly extended 
to them and a more level and competitive economic playing field can be 
established, and the prospects for greater and more broadly distributed 
earning capacity, prosperity, and leisure can be reasonably expected and 
realized by all. 
 
                                                 
1 “Law and economics” has many definitions depending on the school of thought. 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “law and economics” as the “discipline advocating the 
economic analysis of the law, whereby legal rules are subjected to a cost-benefit analysis 
to determine whether a change from one legal rule to another will increase or decrease 
allocative efficiency and social wealth. Originally developed as an approach to antitrust 
policy, law and economics is today used by its proponents to explain and interpret a 
variety of legal subjects.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 901 (8th ed. 2004). 
2 Binary economics is an approach to economics that holds: (1) capital and labor both 
do work, (2) technology makes capital much more productive than labor, and (3) the 
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